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ENCONTRO INTERNACIONAL DE SOLIDARIEDADE COM TIMOR-LESTE

INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF SOLIDARITY WITH EAST TIMOR



LISBOA, 23/24/25 de Março de 1984

LISBON, 23rd, 24th and 25th March 1984

FRETILIN

COMISSÃO PARA OS DIREITOS DO POVO MAUBERE (CDPM)

ENCONTRO INTERNACIONAL DE SOLIDARIEDADE COM TIMOR-LESTE

Lisboa, 23, 24 e 25 de Março de 1984

23 Março - Sessão de Abertura - 21 horas

Apresentação do grupo responsável e dos participantes

Exposição de fotografia e recortes da imprensa portuguesa

24 Março - 9.30 até às 18.30 TRABALHOS

1. Discussão da situação política geral
1.1. Situação político-militar em Timor-Leste e na área
1.2. Situação diplomática

2. Definição das linhas de força para o trabalho de solidariedade
2.1. A luta do povo de Timor-Leste e as conversações Portugal-Indonésia
2.2. O Plano de Paz da FRETILIN
2.3. O papel de Portugal
2.4. O papel da oposição na Indonésia

pontos unificados

25 Março - 9.30 até 13h TRABALHOS

3. Balanço e perspectivas
3.1. Balanço das actividades (Abril 83/Março 84)
3.2. Plano de trabalhos de cada organização
3.3. Acções comuns

18h - Sessão de Encerramento

Apresentação das conclusões à imprensa e às personalidades presentes.

HEIN

ENCONTRO INTERNACIONAL DE SOLIDARIEDADE COM TIMOR-LESTE

INFORMAÇÃO

Hoje não podemos dizer que não existe informação sobre Timor-Leste. De facto, uma série de fontes, de origem e âmbito diversos, têm fornecido uma quantidade grande de dados que nos permitem acompanhar de perto a situação. As notícias divulgadas por organizações internacionais como a Cruz Vermelha Internacional e a Amnistia Internacional, assim como pelas instituições ligadas às Igrejas, pelos refugiados, pelos representantes da FRETILIN têm revelado, sob diferentes aspectos, uma mesma realidade.

A partir destas informações podemos afirmar, com toda a clareza, que a luta do povo de Timor-Leste não é um caso perdido. A evolução da situação, quer no interior de Timor-Leste, quer na própria Indonésia, tem-se acelerado neste último ano, o que nos leva a sentir também como uma necessidade premente a recolha e a divulgação de informação actualizada sobre os dois países.

Propomo-nos pois intensificar o trabalho ao nível da informação, nomeadamente através dos seguintes meios:

- recolha regular e sistematizada e posterior divulgação dos testemunhos dos refugiados timores que se veem forçados a abandonar a sua pátria;
- troca de informação regular entre todos os grupos de solidariedade que trabalham sobre a questão de Timor-Leste;
- acção junto dos jornalistas no sentido de que compreendam a importância que a informação assume nesta luta e de que adoptem uma atitude activa de procura de informação e de denúncia dos entraves que a Indonésia sempre tem colocado ao acesso a Timor-Leste e às notícias sobre a situação no território;
- organização de um Seminário Internacional sobre a Indonésia, a realizar em Lisboa, por ocasião do próximo Dia Internacional de Solidariedade com Timor-Leste (7 de Dezembro).

ENCONTRO INTERNACIONAL DE SOLIDARIEDADE COM TIMOR-LESTE

O PAPEL DAS IGREJAS

Em resposta aos apelos insistentes da Igreja Católica de Timor-Leste, outras Igrejas e organizações religiosas (Pax Christi, Pax Romana, Comissões Justiça e Paz etc...) têm alertado a opinião internacional sobre a situação dramática que se vive em Timor-Leste.

Recentemente, e pela primeira vez, a Conferência Episcopal Indonésia e a Comissão Justiça e Paz de Portugal tornaram público as suas preocupações com a guerra travada em Timor-Leste desde 1975.

Depois de sublinhar o sofrimento do povo de Timor-Leste os bispos indonésios afirmaram que a paz não é apenas ausência de guerra, nem pode ser imposta por uma ditadura, mas que deve fundamentar-se sobre a justiça.

Por seu lado a Comissão Justiça e Paz de Portugal afirma que "desde o princípio da ocupação os massacres se têm sucedido ao ponto de se poder falar de genocídio", e lembra "o direito fundamental do povo de Timor-Leste à autodeterminação", direito que não é respeitado pela Indonésia.

Os participantes no Encontro Internacional de Solidariedade com Timor-Leste saúdam estes documentos das Igrejas dos dois países directamente envolvidos no conflito.

Apelam a todas as Igrejas a manifestarem a sua solidariedade com a Igreja que está em Timor-Leste, onde resiste com o seu povo e sofre com ele.

Convidam também estas Igrejas a apoiar todos os esforços feitos para encontrar uma solução pacífica e justa para o problema de Timor-Leste.

Lisboa, 25 de Março de 1984

THE GO-AHEAD

"Don't ask me whether the Government can say when the killings will stop. If I were to say that the Government can stop them, that would mean acknowledging that the Government is committing the killing"

General Benny Murdani
5 January, 1984

"It is highly likely that the operation to combat criminality, which is still in force in Jogjakarta, will be extended to other cities in my command"

Lt. Gen. Yogie Memet,
Territorial Commander of
Java & Madura.
23 April 1983



"It is better to have a hundred dead criminals than a hundred thousand anxious citizens"

General Ali Said,
Minister of Justice
June 1983

The Jogjakarta military began the killings. Security forces everywhere have continued the operation. The death squads are specially trained troops who dispose of their victims with ruthlessness. Athletic men 'of military bearing' drag people from the street or their houses, to be shot or strangled later. Most reports point to paracommandos from the elite KOPASSANDHA battalion, veterans of the war in East Timor, as the main perpetrators.

THE HISTORY

The killing of up to 4000 people, by well organised death squads in Indonesia, is yet another act of brutality by a regime with an 18 year history of appalling human rights abuses.

Security forces no longer openly admit, as they did at first in Jogja, that they carry out the killings, but the Government has expressed its support for the death squad operations, thus acknowledging that it has dispensed with the rule of law.

A climate of fear exists now in Indonesia. In 1983, three lawyers in East Java, seven people including a well known musician in Bandung, and a journalist in Central Java were reported *missing*, the first political victims of the killings.

May 1982	A foretaste of the 1983 operations: police in East Java conduct campaign against village gangs and Muslim leaders, killing at least 200.
April 1983	Military garrison in Jogjakarta announces operation to 'combat criminality'; killings begin. Lt. Gen. Memet says operation will be spread to rest of Java
May 1983	Death squads active in Jakarta. 48 bodies reported Jan-May, 21 in May alone. Now security forces will not admit responsibility, and newspapers may only refer to 'mystery killers'.
June-July 1983	Total of 55 victims of death squads in Jakarta, 60 in Jogja, 300+ in Java. Murdani admits total is much higher because many bodies are not reported.
August 1983	Government bans all media coverage of killings. 96 deaths reported from Semarang, 89 in West Java, 8 in Pontianak.
Sept-Nov 1983	Death squads intensify operations. Up to 3000 killed in the year, according to Mulya Lubis of the Legal Aid Institute. Report is received of 40 executed by Army firing squad in village of Rengas-Dengklok in West Java
Dec 1983	Asian Regional Council for Human Rights estimates 3000 extra-judicial killings in S.E Asia. Indonesia, with 2000 killings, is by far the worst. Nasution estimates total in Indonesia is double this.
Feb 1984	Figures collected by Indonesian journalist total 8,500 killings in E. Java alone (**Frij Nederland**, 11.2.84).

THE RESPONSE

Buyung Nasution,
Chairman of Legal Aid Institute

"These killings are the beginning of a series of arbitrary actions by the authorities, who think they can do whatever they like... They want to show that they have the right, the complete right, to take people's lives if these people are regarded as a threat, or as something that undermines their authority."

Buyung Nasution, 4 June 1983

Contradicting army claims that people have been killed while trying to escape, forensic expert Dr Abdul Mun'in said "the bodies have generally been shot at close range... sometimes the pistol has been fired right close to the skin. Many bodies have several gunshot wounds, which means the killer wanted to make sure his victim was dead."

A report by the *International Commission of Jurists* stated:
"Whatever the failure of law enforcing agencies to contain the rising crime rate, nothing can justify the summary execution of suspected criminals. Fears are already being expressed in Indonesia that similar methods could in future be resorted to for eliminating political opponents." August 1983

"Everyone I know in Jogjakarta, whether Indonesian or foreign, has either seen one of these killings or heard a first-hand account. For weeks this has been the hottest topic of conversation in town. There is no secret. People are being murdered by the hundred, and yet for some reason no-one seems to have written an accurate account in the international press,"

Letter to *International Herald Tribune*,
18 June 1983

"On one night alone, 4 bodies were found in sacks under Kalianyur bridge..."
"The body of Giot, 18, was found on 4th May by the roadside; there were two bullet wounds in the head... the night before he was dragged away from a bar on the outskirts of Jakarta by five men, four of them armed with pistols."
Tempo (Jakarta), 21 May 1983.

"On 11th May at around 8.30 pm, the body of Joko Sulisno was found in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta. He had been shot twice in the chest. An hour later the body of Baginda Siregar was found near the Blok M bus terminal. He had been shot in the head. The bodies of two other men, also with gunshot wounds, were found..."
Tempo, 21 May 1983

"In June, a jeep stopped regularly at night on a bridge over the Cimedang river, West Java. Local people always found a body in the river the next day, totalling 18 within a month, but were frightened to say anything to the police."
"A villager's duty is to farm," said one man. "These killings are the business of those in authority."
Tempo, 6 Aug 1983

The Indonesian Government describes the activities of army death squads as an operation against criminals. Most bodies are found marked with distinctive tattoos, which indicated they were members of youths gangs, known as gali-gali. Many people are trying desperately to remove tattoos which might incriminate them. Released prisoners have been committing petty crimes to be returned to the safety of jail, and those due for release have pleaded to be allowed to stay.

These killings have been going on for a year now in Indonesia. Little attention has been given to them by Western governments or media, with the exception of Holland, where the Government has been instructed to make formal representations about the killings to Indonesia. The Indonesian regime is being allowed to commit wholesale murder, with barely a whisper of protest in the countries whose own governments give it financial support. In May this year, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) will decide how much aid Jakarta will receive this year: this is an occasion when all those participating must be made aware of the full extent of the killings.

Write to your own parliamentary or governmental representative, let them know your opinion, so that the slaughter in Indonesia is stopped. We are all familiar with death squads and disappearances in Argentina and El Salvador. Who will speak up for the victims in Indonesia?

Issued by

tapol

British Campaign of Political Prisoners for the Defence and Human Rights in Indonesia

8a Treport St, London SW18 2BP, UK

ARMY DEATH SQUADS IN ACTION IN INDONESIA

- Up to 4000 extra-judicial killings in 1983
- Human rights groups protest, but armed forces chief refuses to call a halt

General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of Indonesia's Armed Forces, has refused to take responsibility for thousands of deaths since April last year. Yet all the evidence shows they are the work of army death squads. His statement means the slaughter will continue throughout Indonesia.

General Benny Murdani

TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL
Feb 10/84

some credit for several improvements in East-West relations and ... on behalf of peace will continue, but

Shadow battle hobbles army in Indonesia

By BRYAN JOHNSON
Globe and Mail Reporter

JAKARTA — There are perhaps no more than 200 hardcore guerrillas being chased around East Timor by 10,000 to 15,000 Indonesian troops. But you can't kill what you can't find. Or, as one top Government adviser puts it: "Our army is shooting at shadows."

So the sad saga drags on, nine years after the former Portuguese colony became one of the world's continuing horror stories.

"It's a running sore," says a Western military attache who has visited Indonesia's newest province. "They have tried the hearts-and-minds approach and it didn't wash. Now they have gone back to the big-stick policy and it doesn't seem to be working much better. This thing is going to go on and on until we all get old."

Such tired pessimism comes naturally to those who have been charting events on East Timor since the Portuguese pulled out and Indonesia invaded it in 1975. With an estimated 100,000 dead from a population of only 600,000, there is ample reason for gloom.

Only six months ago, there was guarded optimism on the little half-island between Java and New Guinea. An Australian parliamentary delegation visit produced a positive, if less than glowing, report. Many foreign journalists had been promised entry visas. Health services, electricity and clean water were available on parts of the island for the first time in history. The shooting seemed to have stopped.

Then the roof caved in. An unarmed team of Indonesian Army engineers was attacked

INDONESIANS — Page 14

n Aug. 8 by guerrillas of FRETILIN, the ... morese liberation movement, or their ... rs. The killers had reportedly taken advantage of an Indonesian amnesty offer to come down from the hills and take steady jobs.

The military, and particularly its chief of staff General Murdani, were furious. "This time, no playing around," General Murdani vowed to a (illegible) paper. "We are going to hit them without mercy."

Troops, including a special unit of anti-terrorist Green Berets, were dispatched to the "27th province." All amnesty offers were rescinded and the army set about the task of wiping the jungles and mountains free of FRETILIN guerrillas once and for all.

Critics of the Indonesian regime say the no-mercy strategy included terror tactics and sytematic torture. To prove that point, the London-based human rights group Amnesty International publicized a macabre torture textbook which it says was stolen from Government troops and smuggled to England.

"If the use of force is required," the alleged Indonesian instruction manual says, "there shold not be a member of the local population present to witness it so that the antipathy of the people is not aroused." The book also advises soldiers to "avoid taking photographs showing torture. . . . Remember that such photos should not be found by irresponsible members of society."

Foreign observers are divided over the authenticity of the document, many believing it is a plant of FRETILIN's leftist backers in Portugal. That skepticism does not, however, extend to the use of torture itself. "The Indonesians have been fighting rebel groups of various sorts for nearly 40 years," a diplomat said, "and they never needed a guidebook to teach them about torture. Those guys in the field are really angry. . . . They don't need any lessons on how to get revenge."

But an Indonesian who has just returned from East Timor says that view is already outmoded. Jusuf Wanandi, chairman of the Government-sponsored Centre for Strategic and International Studies and an adviser to the ruling Golkar Party, describes the situation as "much more calm" than has recently been reported.

Mr. Wanandi concedes: "The military was mad, no doubt about it. They had seen their colleagues slaughtered . . . quite literally; they all had their throats slit open. But everyone has calmed down now. There is almost no fighting going on, not in military terms."

If that is true, it is probably because the Indonesian Army cannot find anyone against whom to fight. The rainy season which began in December will last another two months, making the movement of heavy vehicles impossible. The island is almost entirely composed of mountains and deep jungle gorges, with little fresh water and a constant infestation of malaria-carrying mosquitoes.

All in all, it is "a hell of a place to try to find anyone," according to the foreign military attache. "And an even worse place to try to fight with them."

That assessment is echoed by Ali Murtopo, a long-time member of President Suharto's Cabinet who is on the country's Supreme Advisory Council. Like most senior Government leaders,

Mr. Murtopo is a former general of the '45 generation, the independence fighters who battled the Dutch in 1945. So he can analyze the guerrilla campaign from both sides of the jungle.

His assessment is pessimistic. "The smaller the guerrilla, the more difficult he is to catch," Mr. Murtopo says. "That's especially true in East Timor, because the living standard is so low that the people are used to existing on virtually nothing. They live within their environment. They know where the water is. And soldiers just can't do that."

The former general has high regard for the Green Beret units stationed in East Timor but he hints that the regular soldiers are simply incapable of dealing with guerrillas. "It is more an art than a military technique," he says. "The guerrilla doesn't move according to military tactics. He moves according to his stomach, or his sense of security. It is more emotional, more instinctive. So our army is shooting at shadows."

And if the military situation has come to a impasse, the diplomatic front is no more promising. A small majority in the United Nations has voted annually to deny recognition of the Indonesian annexation of East Timor, leaving Portugal in nominal control. But the two sides were so evenly divided at the last UN session that the usual resolution was simply postponed.

The Indonesians are aware that East Timor has given them an international black eye. Relations with neighboring Australia are only now returning to normal, seven years after five Australian journalists were killed while covering the war. And for a country which regularly denounces First World imperialism, it is extremely embarrassing to find the shoe on the other foot.

Most foreign observers agree, however, that the United States and neighboring Asian countries quietly acquiesced in the Indonesian takeover — on the grounds that East Timor might become "an Asian Cuba."

"You have to remember that 1975 was the year the Americans were beaten in Vietnam and the Australians were pulling in their horns," a Jakarta-based diplomat says. "It is widely believed that (former U.S. secretary of state Henry) Kissinger told the Indonesians: do it if you have to, but make it quick and don't kill a lot of people."

Nine years and 100,000 lives later, the diplomat smiles at the grim irony of Mr. Kissinger's alleged instructions.

Instead of conducting a surgical operation, the Indonesia Army descended on East Timor like a herd of elephants determined to stamp out a rabbit colony. Aside from killing a few thousand members of the Marxist FRETILIN, it succeeded in laying waste to the villages and forcing many Timorese into the hills.

"It is certain that thousands of them died," concedes Mr. Wanandi of the CSIS. "But most of them were not killed by the military. . . . They died from starvation or disease. I was there in 1979 when 120,000 people came down from the hills and, my God, you just wouldn't believe the shape they were in. Children with distended stomachs, everyone with skin diseases."

The International Red Cross saved at least 70,000 lives with an emergency treatment program.

Yet Mr. Wanandi argues that Indonesia cannot be held responsible for the tragedy. The Portuguese simply pulled the rug out from under East Timor with their precipitous departure, he says, and FRETILIN members were murderous butchers who plunged their country into immediate civil war.

"The simple fact is," the Indonesian analyst says, "that we had no interest in East Timor at all. There were no emotional ties, because it had never been part of the Dutch empire. We didn't

day and realized what a mess we had right on our doorstep. The Portuguese had left a complete vacuum. . . . The place was in chaos.

"I think we were more or less forced to do what we did."

Security in East Timor — Merdeka. 29 December, 1983

The statement made In Dili on Christmas Day by Armed Forces Commander in Chief, General Benny Murdani is of very great interest to us. He said on the one hand that the Armed Forces would continue to implement their tasks in that region until they have been successfully completed, and on the other hand, he called upon those still on the wrong path to halt their efforts which would never succeed, and said that if they surrender, they will be well treated. General Murdani also said that those who still dream of setting up a state within the territory of the Rpublic of Indonesia which is separate from the Republic should stop pursuing such deeams because such efforts would certainly be in vain.

For ordinary people, particularly those living in places far away from East Timor, they must be wondering what in fact is happening in that region. For a very long time, there has been no news about the security situation there since the so-called 'President of Fretilin' was shot dead. All the news about East Timor is only about the rapid economic development there. When the Australian parliamentary mission visited East Timor, all the reports said that the region was now very quiet and peaceful. Only those people who were persistent enough to listen to foreign news broadcast have occasionally heard news that armed conflicts still occur between the Armed Forces and the trouble-makers there who call themselves Fretilin. People who hear reports like this are inclined to question the accuracy of such reports because the Indonesian Government never publishes any news about the actual position of security in that region.

Although General Murdani did not in his speech provide a detailed account about the security situation in East Timor, we can get the impression that the armed gangs have not yet been crushed. The Commender-in-Chief even said that they are still aiming to set up another state within the State of the Republic of Indonesia, even though he described this as a dream that would never be realised. The impression to be gained from General Murdani's statement is that those armed groups have political motives. If this is indeed the case, then it would be wrong to regard the question of security in East Timor as something trivial.

Efforts by our Armed Forces to safeguard East Timor from the remnants of the Fretilin gangs have been continuing for a number of years; appeals have been made to them for years to surrender yet it now appears that all these efforts have not yet been successful.

We need to devote a great deal of attention to the security situation in East Timor and to study from the experiences of our own history. Armed groups can hold out for a very long time if they have support. This support can come from outside and it can also come from inside. Usually the most decisive factor is the support from inside, that is to say, from the people. Experience shows that if this kind of support is to be handled, it cannot be done only by mititary means. A packet of measures is needed, with good coordination between social political, social-economic, military as well as diplomatic actions.

The question of security in East Timor is not a local affair, something that can be localised. Security in that region is also part of national security which is a matter to be borne the whole nation., a national responsibility. Therefore the Indonesian people should be informed of the real situation in East Timor so as to be able to develop a proper sense of national vigilance.

Well coordinated efforts have indeed already been made by the government. These included diplomatic measures giving the opportunity to members of the Australian parliament to investigate East Timor so as to obtain a clearer understanding and thus reduce the support factor from outside. But it still needs to be considered whether collaboration between the Armed Forces, the people and the government has really taken root in East Timor.

SINAR HARAPAN 27 December, 1983

Christmas in East Timor:

Commander-in-Chief Again Appeals, Those Who Report will be Well Treated

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (ABRI), General Benny Murdani has warned those who are deluded enough to believe that they can set up a state outside the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia to put a stop to their efforts which are doomed to failure because the Armed Forces will never stop performing the duty with which they have been entrusted.

Speaking on Christmas night to troops, religious leaders, leaders of the commuity and local officials in Dili, the C-in-C called upon everyone in the hills, the forests, the caves and the towns to halt their efforts and surrender to the authorities. "As commander of ABRI, I give a guarantee that all those who declare that they have stopped carrying out such condemnable actions will be well treated, will be treated humanely treated," said Benny with great emphasis.

The Commander-in-Chief who spent Christmas Day visiting remote parts of East Timor, said that there are people who spread it around that the lives of people who surrender cannot be safe. "I repeat once again," Benny went on, "that if they report to the closest civil or military authorities, they will be well treated."

The Commander used the occasion to make the point that the birth of Christ as a human being in a poor, simple cattle manger presented a picture of nobility and glory in the midst of suffering and hardship, a picture that was relevant for every single soldier. He felt convinced that this would strengthen the resolve of every member of ABRI. "Each noble and glorious task entrusted to ABRI members is never free of suffering and sacrifice." A soldier, said the Commander, possesses a deep sense of nobility and glory founded upon his devotion to the Motherland, to the Pancasila philosophy and to the Sapta Marga (the ABRI doctrine), so that if necessary he is willing to sacrifice his life. This attitude motivates a soldier's sense of duty as a Sapta Marga soldier, it consoles him and reinforces his mental outlook.

On the occasion of this simple Christma celebration, General Benny Murdani expressed his pride in the knowledge that such consciousness inspires every member of ABRI from the moment he sets foot on East Timor soil to carry out his duties there. "I am quire certain," he went on, "that the great hardship of not being with your families, because you have been entrusted with this great and glorious task for the nation and state, can console you and strengthen your convictions."

He called upon those present to offer up a prayer that our misguided brothers would not need a long time to take their decision to return to the correct path, and to build up East Timor, a country that has been neglected for so many centuries and has suffered so much brutality.

On this Christmas visit, the Commander-in-chief was accompanied by the Chief of Staff for Operations of the Department of Defence and Security/ABRI, Lieutenant-General Himawan Sutanto, Inspector-General of the Department of Defence and Security Lt-General Gunawan Wibisono, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Lt-General Bambang Triantoro, and other senior officers from the Department and other forces. The Commander-in-Chief also visted several isolated ABRI posts in the subdistricts of Oessu (district of Viqueque, Tr), Natarbora (district of Manatuto, Tr) and Alas (district of Manufuhi/Same, Tr)

NB According to an AAP/AFP report from Jakarta (Canberra Times, 15 November 1983), Indonesian aircraft have been in action attacking targets in places as wide apart as Bobonaro, Ainaro, Venilale, Uatulari and Los Palos. The current offensive thus appears to encompass the entire country from west to east. Murdani's speech suggests that four months after the offensive was launched, no progress has been made and that resistance, not only in the bush but also in the Indonesian-occupied towns, is continuing unabated.

The AAP/AFP report adds that twenty helis are providing logistical support with army Hercules C130 transport aircraft regularly shuttling between Jakarta and Dili. The army, it reports, wants to wind up its operations in the area "by the end of January".